

# Webinar

## Oracle Database 11g: Security



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More about me: <http://uhesse.wordpress.com/about>


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ORACLE

# Agenda

- **“Traditional” Auditing**
  - Brief introduction
  - Demonstration
- **Auditing the SYS user**
  - Brief introduction
  - Demonstration
- **Fine Grained Auditing**
  - Brief introduction
  - Demonstration
- **Transparent Data Encryption**
  - Brief introduction
  - Demonstration

# “Traditional” Auditing



## Examples for “**Traditional**” auditing on: a) Privileges, b) Objects, c) Statements

```
SQL> alter system set audit_trail='DB' ,'EXTENDED'  
scope=spfile;
```

```
SQL> audit session whenever not successful; -- a)
```

```
SQL> audit all on hr.employees by access whenever  
successful; -- b)
```

```
SQL> audit table by access whenever successful; -- c)
```

# **Demonstration Traditional Auditing ...**

# Possible values for AUDIT\_TRAIL:

NONE (Default before 11g)

DB (**Default in 11g**) → Table `sys.aud$`, accessed by `DBA_AUDIT_TRAIL`

OS → OS textfile, directory specified by `AUDIT_FILE_DEST`

XML → OS file, dito, accessed by `v$XML_AUDIT_TRAIL`

**DB, EXTENDED** (setting in our demo, includes *complete statements*)

**XML, EXTENDED** (as above, in XML files)

# Auditing the SYS user

Users with the SYSDBA or SYSOPER privileges can connect when the database is closed.

- Audit trail *must* be stored outside the database
- Directory is determined by `audit_file_dest`
- *Connections* as SYSDBA or SYSOPER are *always audited*.
- You can enable *additional auditing* with `audit_sys_operations`



# Steps to audit all actions of sys into a file owned by root

```
SQL> alter system set audit_sys_operations = true  
scope=spfile;
```

```
SQL> alter system set audit_syslog_level =  
'LOCAL1.WARNING' scope=spfile;
```


```
[root@uhesse ~]# cat /etc/syslog.conf | grep local1  
local1.warning /var/log/audit.log
```

```
[root@uhesse ~]# /etc/rc.d/init.d/syslog restart
```

# **Demonstration Auditing sys ...**

# Fine-Grained Auditing

- Audits *only if definable conditions are met*
- Possible for SELECT and DML
- Can be linked to a table or view, to one or more columns
- Implemented with the DBMS\_FGA package



## FGA Policy in action:

```
BEGIN
  dbms_fga.add_policy(
    object_schema => 'HR',
    object_name => 'EMPLOYEES',
    policy_name => 'my_policy',
    audit_column => 'salary',
    statement_types => 'SELECT,INSERT,UPDATE,DELETE');
END;
/
```

```
SQL> select last_name,email from employees; -- no audit entries!
```

```
SQL> select last_name,salary from employees; -- audited!
SQL> update employees set salary = salary+500; -- audited!
```

```
SQL> select db_user,os_user,sql_text,timestamp
       from dba_fga_audit_trail where db_user='HR' ;
```


# **Demonstration Fine Grained Auditing ...**

# Auditing Considerations

Some things to be aware of:

- Are you in line with your (national) legal conditions?
- Auditing may consume much space, especially
  - with `AUDIT_TRAIL = ..., EXTENDED`
  - with `AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS = TRUE`
- A strategy is needed to
  - *analyse* the audit information
  - *remove* old audit information
    - from `sys.aud$` (Traditional Auditing)
    - from filesystem (auditing of `sys` or `AUDIT_TRAIL=OS`)
    - from `sys.fga_log$` (Fine Grained Auditing)

# Transparent Data Encryption: Overview



# Steps to setup TDE ...

Add the following to \$ORACLE\_HOME/network/admin/sqlnet.ora :

```
ENCRYPTION_WALLET_LOCATION=
(source=
  (METHOD=FILE)
  (METHOD_DATA=
    (DIRECTORY=/u01/app/oracle/admin/orcl/wallet)
  )
)
```

Create that directory at the OS prompt:

```
mkdir /u01/app/oracle/admin/orcl/wallet
```

Set the TDE master password (implicitly creating the wallet):

```
SQL> alter system set encryption key identified by "oracle";
```

## ... continued Steps TDE

In 10g already: Create tables with encrypted columns

```
SQL> create table cia.bgents  
      (id number, covername varchar2(20), realname  
       varchar2(20) encrypt);
```

In 11g: Create encrypted tablespaces:

```
SQL> create tablespace krypto datafile  
      '/u01/app/oracle/oradata/orcl/krypto01.dbf' size 1m  
      encryption default storage (encrypt);
```

# TDE in action...

**Attacker has stolen my whole database!**

**After startup of the instance:**

```
SQL> select * from cia.bgents;  
      select * from cia.bgents  
              *  
ERROR at line 1:  
ORA-28365: wallet is not open
```

**Let's look into the datafile:**

```
[oracle@uhesse orcl]$ strings krypto01.dbf | grep Hesse
```

**It's encrypted! No realname is exposed. (10g and 11g way either)**

## ... continued TDE in action

What if we dump the blocks?

```
SQL> select dbms_rowid.rowid_relative_fno(rowid),  
           dbms_rowid.rowid_block_number(rowid) from cia.bgents;  
  
SQL> alter system dump datafile &x block &y;
```

The block dumps in `user_dump_dest` don't expose the encrypted values! Only if we specify the *correct password of the original wallet*, the encrypted content is readable:

```
SQL> alter system set encryption wallet open identified  
           by "oracle";
```

Even after the creation of a new wallet, it would not be possible to read the encrypted tables!

# **Demonstration Transparent Data Encryption ...**

# TDE Considerations

- You need a **backup of the wallet!** It can't be simply recreated ...
- TDE does not protect against DB users, that have access privileges on the tables. That is exactly the meaning of “Transparent” here.

# Thank you for your attention!



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